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Abstract: It is widely believed that people are sometimes directly aware of their own
psychological states and consequently better placed than others to know what the con-
tents of those states are. This (‘commonsense’) view has been challenged by Alison
Gopnik. She claims that experimental evidence from the behaviour of 3- and 4-year-
old children both supports the theory theory and shows that the belief in direct and
privileged knowledge of one’s own intentional states is an illusion. I argue (1) that the
experimental evidence is not inconsistent with the commonsense view and that Gop-
nik’s central thesis assumes a particularly crude perceptual account of self-knowledge
to which that view is not committed, and (2) that the commonsense view is neutral
as between the theory theory and other theories of mind.
It is widely believed that people are, at least sometimes, directly or immediately
aware of their own psychological states and so better placed than others to
know what the contents of those states are. This belief is said to be a dictate
of commonsense, or folk, psychology. We might call it ‘the commonsense
view’.
1 Commonsense tells us that we, as subjects of our own psychological
states, not only know them, but sometimes know them in a direct and privi-
leged sort of way.
A number of views about people depend on this assumption of privileged
access. The liberal conception in political philosophy, for example, assumes
that subjects are in a better position than others to know their own desires.2
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1 This is Alison Gopnik’s (1993) term.
2 The classic example is Mill, who says
But neither one person, nor any number of persons, is warranted in saying to another
human creature…that he shall not do with his life for his own beneﬁt what he chooses
to do with it. ….The interest which any other person…can have in it, is triﬂing…and
altogether indirect: while, with respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most
ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can
be possessed by any one else (1989, p. 76).
By ‘feelings’ Mill here clearly means ‘desires’.
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And the conception of agents as responsible for their actions presumes that
they know, in a way that others do not, what their intentions are in so acting.
These views assume, as commonsense does, that there is an asymmetry
between self-knowledge and knowledge of others in that the former, unlike
the latter, is at least sometimes authoritative.
I think that commonsense is right about this. When I say to a friend, ‘I’m
going to the bank’, I know, in a way that my friend does not, what I mean
by ‘bank’. I don’t need to wonder, as my friend might, whether I’m going
ﬁshing or going to get some cash. When I stammer over a word, I know
which word I am struggling to utter, in a way in which you, listening to me,
do not. When I look at the clock and think to myself, ‘it’s time to get moving’,
I know what I am thinking in a way that my audience does not. I somehow
know it ‘directly’ or ‘immediately’. Such terms as ‘direct’ and ‘immediate’ may
be vague, or ambiguous, and so may stand in need of clariﬁcation. And part
of my aim here is to try to arrive at a somewhat clearer characterization of
them. But the view about self-knowledge that they help to articulate is one
that we all recognize and endorse in countless ways in our day-to-day interac-
tions with each other.
However, the view that commonsense is right has recently been challenged
by Alison Gopnik (Gopnik, 1993). Gopnik is speciﬁcally concerned to rebut
claims to privileged self-knowledge of intentional states, ones which, like
believing, thinking, or knowing that p (for some propositional content p),
relate an agent to a propositional content under an attitudinal mode. Com-
monsense tells us that we normal adults have privileged access to the contents
of our own thoughts. But Gopnik claims that 3-year-old children do not have
such privileged access. She claims that experimental evidence from the behav-
iour of 3-year-old and 4-year-old children supports the thesis that children
undergo a major conceptual shift between the ages of 3 and 4. This shift is
marked by the acquisition of a theory of mind. Before this conceptual shift
takes place, children do have psychological experiences and psychological
states, but they do not comprehend the intentionality of certain of their own,
and others’, psychological states (speciﬁcally, their beliefs). It is only after the
acquisition of a theory of mind, which enables children to comprehend the
representational nature of their own and others’ psychological states, that they
are able to comprehend the intentionality of those states.3 Thus children before
3 So, for example, she says,
By the age of 4 or 5, children, at least in our culture, have developed something more
like a representational model of mind. Accordingly, almost all psychological functioning
in 5-year-olds is mediated by representations. Desires, perceptions, beliefs, pretenses, and
images all involve the same basic structure, one sometimes described in terms of prop-
ositional attitudes and propositional contents. These mental states all involve represen-
tations of reality, rather than direct relations to reality itself. Perceiving, desiring, and
believing become perceiving, desiring, and believing that (1993, p. 6).
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the age of 4 do not experience intentional states as intentional states; they do
not have the concept of an intentional state. For Gopnik, concepts and theory
go hand in hand. So experiencing, and hence knowing, intentional states as
intentional requires, and is mediated by, a theory of mind.
4
The claim that knowledge of intentional states is theory-dependent is one
of a number of claims associated with the view known as the ‘theory theory’.
Brieﬂy put, this is the view that
…commonsense psychology, including the idea of intentionality, is a
theory that explains experience and behaviour. Like scientiﬁc theories,
commonsense theories are ‘defeasible’, that is, they are refutable and
revisable. (Gopnik,1993, pp. 2–3)
According to Gopnik, we have no reason to think that beliefs that are theory-
dependent apply differently to the self than they do to others. And she takes
the results of experimental studies on the behaviour of 3-year-old and 4-year-
old children to support this view. Self-knowledge is on a par with knowledge
of others, not only in that both make use of the same concepts, but also in
that they have the same developmental or cognitive history (1993, p. 2). In
both cases, such knowledge is mediated by one and the same theory of mind.
Gopnik takes this to mean that knowledge of intentionality is, in every
case, inferential, not perceptual.
5 Further, she assumes that this is true, not
4 There is, however, experimental evidence which seems to show that 3-year-olds comprehend
the intentionality of others’ mental states, but cannot articulate it or act on it in the experi-
mental context. So, for example, when asked where Sally will look for the marble, or thinks
the marble is, 3-year-olds look in the right direction. Further, if placed in an environment
where the concept of belief is introduced and explained, 3-year-olds can pass the task. (See
Fodor, 1992, and Peterson and Siegel, 2000.) It may be that this is also the case for the ﬁrst-
person situation.
Moreover, commonsense allows that we cannot have authoritative self-knowledge of our
thoughts until we have some kind of conception of thoughts. So it does not rule out the
view that privileged self-knowledge requires the possession of the concept of thoughts. Com-
monsense also seems to allow that we can have thoughts before we have a conception of
thoughts. It even seems to allow that the development of a conception of thoughts might
go through various stages of muddle. So a good deal of what Gopnik is arguing depends on
the question of what is involved in a ‘theory of mind’ over and above having the concept
of mental states such as thoughts. Later I will suggest that Gopnik’s view just is that the very
possession of the concept of a mental state requires the possession of a ‘theory’ of mind, and
that the mere attribution of a mental state involves attributing the concept of a mental state
and hence a theory of mind. Contrast this with Stich and Nichols (1992, 1995).
5 Notice that Gopnik here seems to be equating ‘non-inferential’ with ‘not theoretically
mediated’. But if one supposes that perception is modular, one can consistently maintain
both that perception involves inference and that such inference is not theoretically mediated
because impenetrable to Gopnik-style theory. Thanks here to Philip Gerrans.
It is unclear whether Gopnik takes psychological experiences to be representational, hence
intentional, or not. The following passages suggests not:
According to the views of Gibson and Dretske, at least some kinds of perception are not
viewed as representational in the usual sense. Instead, the idea is that there is a more direct
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only of 3-year-olds, but also of older children (from around the age of four
onwards) and adults. Her verdict is that the belief in direct (in the sense of
non-inferential) and privileged self-knowledge is an illusion.6
In what follows, I want to accomplish two things. First, I want to consider
Gopnik’s attempt to use the developmental data to decide the issue both in
favour of the theory theory and against the commonsense view. I shall argue
that this data does not support her claim that the commonsense view is incon-
sistent with the theory theory. Since the case for an opposition between the
commonsense view and the theory theory has not been made out, then, Gop-
nik needs to consider two questions separately: (a) whether the developmental
data presents a problem for the commonsense view, and (b) whether it consti-
tutes an argument in favour of the theory theory. My claim is that the answer
to (a) is ‘no’, irrespective of what the answer to (b) is. This is one reason why
Gopnik would need to argue separately from the data to the denial of the
commonsense view and from the data to the truth of the theory theory.
Further, I argue that Gopnik presumes a certain perceptual model of intro-
spective self-knowledge which leads to claims about the commonsense view
that are both unnecessary and highly implausible. Her failure to see how a
perceptual model of self-knowledge might be reconcilable with the common-
sense view is due more to a failure to appreciate the range of models that go
causal link between the world and the mind. In Gibson’s terminology, perception involves
a kind of “resonance” between objects in the world and the organism; in Dretske’s, infor-
mation (in the technical sense) ﬂows from the object to the organism. I suggest that 3-
year-olds understand all relations between the world and the mind, including those that
involve beliefs, in a similar way (1993, p. 13, note 5)
where, by ‘perception’, Gopnik seems to mean, ‘perceptual experience that bears a direct
causal relation to the object of perception’.
6 It isn’t obvious, even if Gopnik is right about this, that once children acquire a ‘theory of
mind’ they must make self-attributions on precisely the same evidential basis that they make
other-attributions. Further, since the experimental evidence from 3- and 4-year-olds’ self-
attributions concerns self-attributions of past mental states, it is not obvious, even if Gopnik
is right, what this tells us about present-tense self-attributions. These points are taken up
later in the text (sections 3 and 2, respectively).
There is a further complication here, and one to which we shall return (section 3). By
‘direct’, Gopnik seems to mean a number of things. In some places, she means ‘noninferential’
(1993, p. 2); at others, she clearly means ‘causally direct’ (1993, p. 11); and at still others,
she seems to mean ‘unmediated’(1993, p. 6). These conceptions of ‘direct’ are not equivalent
to one another, yet Gopnik does not distinguish between them. Thus, for example, the fact
that I perceive the apple on my desk through my eyeglasses does not thereby make my
access to it causally indirect, nor does it make it inferential. But my perception is mediated
by my eyeglasses. One result of conﬂating these different senses of ‘direct’ is that Gopnik
assumes that if perception is direct, it is not concept-dependent, or mediated by concepts.
However, it does not follow from the fact that an experience is causally direct that it is
unmediated by concepts. Nor does it follow from the fact that an item of knowledge is
concept-dependent that it is inferred from a theory. These points will be the focus of dis-
cussion in section 3, since they bear directly on Gopnik’s claim that the theory theory is
incompatible with the commonsense view.
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under the name ‘perceptual’ than to any inherent inconsistency between them
and the commonsense view.
My ﬁrst aim accomplished, I turn to the second. Here I address the question
of what, exactly, the relationship is between the theory theory and the com-
monsense view. I spend some time disentangling various theses that the theory
theory might be taken to express, and argue that the commonsense view is in
fact neutral with regard to the truth or falsity of the central ones. I argue that
Gopnik’s failure to appreciate this can be traced to her inclination to draw a
sharp distinction between phenomenological and intentional content, which
in turn stems from her commitment to a particular perceptual model of
self-knowledge.
Before proceeding to these sections of the paper, some preliminary issues
need to be addressed. Gopnik works with a difﬁcult and complex taxonomy
of psychological phenomena, and she has quite speciﬁc views about certain
contrasting pairs of notions such as ‘direct/indirect’,a n d
‘perceptual/cognitive’. We need to understand the taxonomy if we are to
make any progress in the debate. In section 1 below, I address these preliminary
issues, and preﬁgure some of the claims that will be important in later sections
of the paper, particularly in section 3. In section 2 I focus on my ﬁrst aim. In
section 3 I focus on the second.
1. The Background
Central to Gopnik’s argument against the commonsense view is her contrast
between psychological phenomena to which we have ‘direct’ access, and
psychological phenomena to which we have only ‘inferential’ or ‘mediated’
access. Gopnik believes that, in certain cases at least, one can have non-inferen-
tial (in the sense of non-theoretically mediated) introspective access to one’s
own psychological phenomena; access which she describes as ‘direct’.S h e
characterizes the relevant phenomena as ‘conscious experiences with a parti-
cular kind of phenomenology, the Joycean or Woolﬁan stream of conscious-
ness’ (1993, p. 1), and reserves the term ‘psychological experiences’ for them.
These experiences she contrasts with psychological states, ‘the underlying enti-
ties that explain behaviour and experience’, whose essential characteristic is
that they are intentional (1993, p. 1).
Psychological experiences are distinguishable from psychological states in
two ways. First, experiences have a particular kind of phenomenology. Second,
subjects have direct access to their own psychological experiences by way of
having direct access to their phenomenology.
In contrast to this, subjects do not have direct access to their own psycho-
logical states. Awareness of these requires awareness of their intentionality, and
this requires the application of a theory of mind to psychological experiences,
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of which one is directly aware.7 Further, although subjects believe that they
experience their psychological states directly, this experience is illusory.
Thus, in Gopnik’s classiﬁcatory scheme, there are three items in the psycho-
logical domain concerning which the question of whether one has ‘direct and
privileged’ self-knowledge of them might arise. There are one’s psychological
states (say, one’s belief that water is transparent); there are one’s psychological
experiences of one’s psychological states (to use Gopnik’s terminology, one’s
‘own-belief-experiences’ (1993, p. 13)); and there are beliefs that one has about
one’s own psychological states, based, at least in part, on one’s psychological
experiences of those states (say, one’s belief that one believes that water is
transparent).
This is analogous to the case of perception, where there are also three items.
First, there is the object of perception (say, the round red apple). Second, there
is the perceptual experience of the object of perception (the ‘round-red-apple-
experience’). Third, there is the belief one has about the object of perception
(the belief that there’s a round red apple).
However, for Gopnik there is this important difference. In the case of per-
ception, it is natural and correct to view the relation between the experience
and its object as being direct. But this is not a viable way to view the relation
between those psychological experiences that are experiences of psychological
states and psychological states themselves. For Gopnik, subjects do not per-
ceive, in any sense of ‘perceive’ that involves the idea of direct experience, the
intentionality of their own psychological states—their representational nature.
Further, since intentional psychological states have no particular phenomen-
ology associated with them, subjects do not perceive these states.
Gopnik’s view about psychological experiences involves a commitment to
a particular perceptual model of introspective self-knowledge, and she assumes
7 According to Gopnik,
…we might construe the assertion of ﬁrst-person privileged knowledge as a matter of
phenomenology. It concerns the way our psychological experience feels to us. This
assertion also seems incontrovertibly true (ibid., p. 1).
So the mistake commonsense makes, it seems, is not in supposing that our introspective
access to our psychological experiences is direct, since that supposition is true. The mistake
comes with the supposition that there is a direct link between psychological experiences and
psychological states, so that introspective access to the latter is also direct.
I do not deny that there are internal psychological states; on the contrary, discovering the
nature of such states is the fundamental task of psychology. … I even suggest that there
may be cases in which psychological states do lead directly to psychological experiences,
cases in which there is genuine perception of a psychological state.
What I do want to argue is that intentionality is not such a case (ibid., p. 12).
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that the commonsense view is committed to it.8 But this assumption is false.
What I shall argue is that there is a perceptual model of self-knowledge which
does not require a rejection of the commonsense view.
2. Does the Data Really Show that the Commonsense View is
False?
Gopnik’s support for the theory theory is based on developmental data from
experiments involving 3-year-old and 4-year-old children. The experiments
are designed to test whether these children understand what it is to have a false
belief. There are two basic types of tasks, whose failure to perform correctly by
3-year-olds strongly suggest that they do not have the concept of false belief,
and whose successful performance by 4-year-olds strongly suggests that they
do have the concept of false belief. Against the background of other signiﬁcant
developmental data, Gopnik takes this data to show (1) that 3-year-olds do
not have the concept of intentionality and so do not have self-knowledge of
the intentionality of their own psychological states; (2) that 4-year-olds do
have the concept of intentionality and so do have self-knowledge of the inten-
tionality of their own psychological states, and (3) that the difference between
the two consists in the construction, at some point in development between
the ages of 3 and 4, of a theory of mind by children. It is only after the
construction of a theory of mind that children (hence adults) are able to have
self-knowledge of the intentionality of their own psychological states.9
I cannot do justice here to the tremendous amount of literature docu-
menting experimental studies on the cognitive development of 3- and 4-year-
old children that has been cited both in support of and against Gopnik’s claim
in the past decade alone. However, two examples, one illustrating failure of
3-year-olds successfully to perform a particular false belief task concerning
others, and the other illustrating their failure successfully to perform that same
false belief task with regard to their own past psychological states, may be
helpful here. The false belief task is known as the deceptive box, or unexpected
8 Thus, Shoemaker claims,
…[Gopnik] apparently thinks that just because the concepts involved in these self-ascrip-
tions are theoretical, as in the theory theory, it cannot be the case that we directly experi-
ence our possession of the beliefs, desires, and so on, that are self-ascribed. Here, I think,
we see the perceptual model of introspection at work. The assumption is that the self-
ascriptions must be grounded on something like sense perception, and that where claims
with theoretical content are grounded on perception they cannot be direct perceptual
reports and must be instead the product of some kind of inference (Shoemaker, 1993,
p. 79).
9 But see Peter Carruthers (1996), who argues that it is possible for someone who believes
that the concept of belief is held in place by a theory (and so is a theoretical concept)
nevertheless to have a perceptual model of how ﬁrst-personal attributions are actually car-
ried out.
 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2002474 C. Macdonald
contents, task (Perner et al., 1987; adapted to the ﬁrst person case by Gopnik
and Astington, 1988).10
In this experiment (Perner et al., 1987; Gopnik and Astington, 1988), a
group of 3-year-olds is presented with a closed Smarties tube, and asked what
they think is in the tube. They report that they think that candy is in the
tube. Then the tube is opened in the presence of the children, and they are
allowed to see its contents, which turn out to be pencils, not candy. They are
then asked what another subject, who has not seen the opened tube, will think
is in the tube when they ﬁrst see it. They report that that subject will think
that pencils are in the tube. This, Gopnik claims, strongly suggests that these
children believe that objects and states of the world are directly (or ‘trans-
parently’ (1993)) apprehended by the mind, and so don’t appreciate that
another person might misrepresent the world—in this case, the tube—as con-
taining candy.
This kind of failure to appreciate that others, who are not in the same
epistemic position as they themselves are in, may fail to represent the world
as it is, and instead represent it as it is not, (i.e., misrepresent it) is a failure in
false-belief tasks. But there is another kind of failure that 3-year-olds display
of a false-belief kind which strongly suggests that these children not only fail
to appreciate the intentionality of others’ psychological states, but fail to
appreciate the intentionality of their own psychological states. This is illustrated
by a second experiment involving the deceptive box task, which differs slightly
from the ﬁrst.
In this second experiment (Gopnik and Astington, 1988; replicated with
additional controls by Wimmer and Hartl, 1991), 3-year-olds are, as before,
shown a Smarties tube and asked what they think is in the tube. They respond
that they think that candy is in the tube. Then the tube is opened in the
presence of the children and they are allowed to see that there are pencils,
not candy, in it. Then they are asked what they thought, when they ﬁrst saw
the tube and before it was opened, was in the tube—a question concerning
their own immediately past beliefs. 1/2 to 2/3 of the group consistently
respond by saying that they always thought that pencils were in the tube.
This, Gopnik claims, strongly suggests that 3-year-old children are not only
10 This contrasts with a second false belief task, known as the unseen displacement, or unexpec-
ted transfer, task. Here a scene with two dolls, Maxi and his mother, is enacted in front of
a child. In this scene, Maxi and his mother return home with some shopping items, and Maxi
places some chocolate in a blue cupboard in the kitchen, where they both are unpacking the
shopping. Then he leaves the room. In his absence, Maxi’s mother removes the chocolate
from the blue cupboard, uses some of it, and replaces the remainder in a different cupboard.
The child is asked where Maxi will look for the chocolate when he returns to the room.
Children under the age of 4 consistently say that Maxi will look in the cupboard where it
now is, rather than the cupboard in which Maxi originally placed it. Children aged 4 consist-
ently say that Maxi will look in the blue cupboard, where Maxi originally placed it (see
Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Perner et al., 1987).
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unable to appreciate that another person might misrepresent the world, but
that they are unable to appreciate that they themselves might misrepresent the
world. For they do not recognize that their past beliefs or thoughts might be
erroneous. This again supports the view that 3-year-olds do not appreciate the
intentionality of psychological states.
11
According to Gopnik, data of the second kind does more than this. It sug-
gests not only that children (hence adults) need a theory of mind in order to
appreciate the intentionality of others’ psychological states, but that they need
a theory of mind in order to appreciate the intentionality of their own psycho-
logical states. And if this is right, then the belief that one has direct, privileged
awareness or knowledge of one’s own intentional psychological states (as
opposed to one’s experiences) is false.
It is tempting to respond to this by arguing, as some (e.g., Chandler and
Carpendale, 1993; Harris, 1991; Nichols, 1993) have, that the commonsense
view only applies to one’s current, consciously entertained states, and not to
subjects’ past psychological states. This seems right, even by Gopnik’s own
lights. The commonsense view concerns knowledge of states to which subjects
can have ‘direct and privileged’ access. But Gopnik treats ‘direct’ both as equiv-
alent to ‘noninferential’ and as elliptical for ‘causally direct’. And knowledge
of one’s own past psychological states is not, in involving memory, plausibly
viewed as causally ‘direct’. So the commonsense view does not apply to such
states, and the developmental data is consistent with it.
The fact that knowledge of the past (even one’s own past psychological
states) involves memory, and memory is fallible, suggests another, different
response. It might be argued that 3-year-olds’ failure to perform correctly on
false-belief tasks with regard to what others think about a situation here and
now may well be evidence that such children lack a theory of mind by which
they are able to understand the intentionality of others’ psychological states.
But it is not evidence that these children lack a theory of mind by which they
are able to understand the intentionality of their own states. This is because,
in their own case, what they are being asked to do is correctly remember their
own past states.
Gopnik argues, however, that this failure cannot be put down to a mere
memory failure.
12 For 3-year-old children are consistently able to report their
11 But see Russell (1996) for a counter interpretation of the result that 3-year-olds don’t
appreciate that their past beliefs or thoughts might be erroneous in terms of an executive
function/attention switching problem.
12 Goldman (1993) argues that it isn’ta‘simple’ memory failure, but may be a memory failure
nonetheless. His claim is that results from Mitchell and Lacohee (1991) show that 3-year-
olds perform signiﬁcantly better on false belief tasks concerning their own past beliefs when
they are given mnemonic assistance:
After children expressed their false expectation of what is in a box (e.g., candy) they
selected a picture of what they thought was inside and “mailed” it. With this manipu-
lation, 18 out of 20 3-year-olds later reported correctly that they had previously thought
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past states of pretense and imagining, as well as their past desires. They do not
report them inaccurately. Gopnik maintains that this is further evidence of the
source of failure of 3-year-olds to accurately report their past beliefs, namely,
that they cannot appreciate that their intentional psychological states might
misrepresent the world (1993, p. 8). According to her, in pretense the world
is not presented as being a certain way, or any way at all: children know that
the banana that they are pretending is a telephone is not a telephone. Pretense
is not about representing or misrepresenting the world. Similarly for imagin-
ings, and for desires. In all of these cases, children do not need to appreciate
the intentionality of their psychological states, because they can appreciate
them without needing, as it were, to match them up with perceived reality
with which they may conﬂict.13
So the response that the failure of 3-year-olds to correctly report their past
beliefs is a memory failure is not an easy one to pursue. It would require a
much more sophisticated argument to reconcile this with the data about past
states of pretense and imagining, and past desires, in 3-year-olds.
14
A much more plausible response, at least on the face of it, would be to
maintain that 3-year-olds do appreciate the intentionality of their beliefs to
the extent that they appreciate that they are about the world around them.15
What they lack is a complete understanding of the intentionality of their psycho-
logical states. In particular, they do not appreciate that their psychological states
may misrepresent the world (i.e., represent it as it is not) as well as be about
the world as it is. In other words, they do not lack a concept of intentionality
altogether; they simply have an incomplete concept.
that candy was in the box, although they now knew it was pencils (Goldman, 1993a, p.
43).
Goldman takes this to support the thesis that there is an information-processing problem
in 3-year-olds. It seems that the overt action of ‘mailing’ helped either to strengthen the
memories of 3-year-olds’ past beliefs or to distinguish these past beliefs from their present
ones.
13 Gopnik puts this point by saying that, for 3-year-olds, there are two kinds of psychological
states, ‘silly states’ and ‘serious states’. The former include pretenses, images and dreams,
whereas the latter include beliefs and perceptions. Further,
For young children, pretenses and images are unrelated to reality: They cannot be false—
or true, for that matter (1993, p. 7).
14 See also the experiments with the changes of location drawings in which children misidentify
their own immediately past beliefs (BBS Symposium, 1993). Once again an executive mech-
anism may be involved.
15 In fact, it seems that 3-year-olds must appreciate the intentionality of their beliefs at least
to this extent, if we are to make sense of the ‘serious’/’silly’ state distinction. Harris (1993,
p. 48) suggests something along the lines of what I am suggesting here, although he does
not describe it in terms of the incompleteness of a concept, and it is unclear whether he
takes the conceptual difference between 3-year-olds and 4-year-olds to consist in a difference
in completeness of the same concept possessed or whether he takes 3-year-olds and 4-year-
olds to possess two different concepts.
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If this is right, we can agree that the problem is not one of memory. But
the point that the commonsense view only applies to one’s current, consciously
entertained states still seems to stand. For it is possible that 3-year-olds have
acquired an important part of the concept of belief, namely, that it aims at
truth, without having yet acquired a ﬁrm grasp of the fact that belief aims at
truth but sometimes fails to reach its target. And appreciation of this latter
might be required for an understanding of misrepresentation and correspond-
ingly of false belief. In this case, 3-year-olds might fail to distinguish the ques-
tion ‘What does/did X think?’ from ‘What is/was the thing for X to think?’.16
This suggestion has also been supported by appeal to developmental data.
First, 3-year-olds are much better at reporting their own current, conscious
(intentional) psychological states than they are at reporting the current, con-
scious states of others (Perner and Ogden, 1988; Povinelli and DeBlois, 1992;
Wimmer et al., 1998a). Second, they are consistently correct in reporting their
current beliefs, if not their erroneous ones of the past (Harris, 1991; Gopnik
and Slaughter, 1991).
17 Third, they appreciate that their psychological states
are not states of the world (as evidenced, for example, by the fact that they
report their imaginings as like ‘making pictures’ in their minds) (Estes et al.,
1989; Harris, 1993). All of this indicates that, while they may not understand
completely the nature of representation, they do understand the nature of
intentionality. One reason for their failure to appreciate that intentional states
might misrepresent may be that their ﬁrst-personal present-tense experience of
intentionality is ﬁrst and foremost experience of their own current, consciously
entertained intentional states, not of their past intentional states or the inten-
tional states of others.
This explanation, unlike Gopnik’s, makes space for the possibility that the
conceptual shift that takes place between the ages of 3 and 4, while being a
major one, is not an all-or-nothing affair. One can have an incomplete con-
cept. But it also makes space for the view that subjects do at least sometimes
have direct, privileged awareness of the contents of their own intentional
psychological states. The commonsense view need not commit one to any
claim about how privileged this awareness is, nor to any particular view as to
which class of intentional states are privileged in this way. Further, it is plainly
consistent with the commonsense view that authority comes in degrees, not
just in the sense that at any given time a subject may be more authoritative
about her present, consciously entertained intentional psychological states than
16 I owe this way of putting the point to Martin Davies.
17 It is arguable that this particular piece of evidence is not adequate to support the claim that
3-year-olds have mastered an important part of the concept of representation, since, unlike
the case in which they ‘imagine’ situations which are alternatives to their current picture
of the world, in this case they are faced with only one picture of the world, their current
one. In this case, it might be argued, there isn’t sufﬁcient basis for attributing to them
appreciation of the difference between their reports about their own current beliefs and reports
about the world. Thanks to an anonymous referee for this point.
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those of her past, even her immediate past, but also in the sense that over
time a subject may become more authoritative about certain of her intentional
psychological states as a result of cognitive development.18
This alternative explanation need not be viewed as taking a stand either for
or against the theory theory. For the explanation allows for the possibility that
the data does favour the theory theory. What it does not guarantee is that in
favouring the theory theory, the data counts against the commonsense view.
This should not surprise us. After all, the commonsense view is not commit-
ted to any developmental theory: it is only committed to the view that subjects
are directly aware of the intentional contents of certain of their own intentional
states, and to an asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of others.
How they arrive at that awareness is not part of the story. In the same way,
perhaps, subjects are directly aware of the grammaticality of language (certain
phrases just ‘sound’ wrong), but they are only aware after they acquire com-
petence. How that competence is acquired may be inaccessible to them, but
no one would deny that they are so aware on that basis. Further, it would be
no objection to that story that competence comes in degrees and develops in
stages. In short, applied to language, Gopnik’s view sounds very implausible.19
Let us recapitulate. Two responses have been given to Gopnik’s claim that
the developmental data shows that the theory theory is incompatible with the
commonsense view. First, whereas the developmental data concerns subjects’
knowledge of their past psychological states, the commonsense view concerns
subjects’ knowledge of their current conscious states. So while the data may
show that subjects are not authoritative with regard to knowledge of their
own past psychological states, it does not show that the commonsense view
is false.
Second, the developmental data is consistent with the view that 3-year-
olds do have the concept of an intentional state, but that this concept is incom-
plete. This in turn is consistent with the commonsense view. For the claim
that subjects have direct and privileged knowledge of the contents of their
psychological states (of their representations) is compatible with failure to
recognize that sometimes these contents can misrepresent. Indeed, the com-
monsense view about epistemic privilege concerns the contents of such states
only; it says nothing about the epistemic status of subjects’ knowledge of the
truth or falsity of such contents, let alone about how that knowledge is
18 So what I have claimed so far is that the commonsense view of self-knowledge need not
have a problem accounting for the developmental data that Gopnik takes to favour theory
theory. But the point here is not that having a correct theory need not be an all-or-nothing
affair. It is that even if the data does favour the theory theory, it does not count against
the commonsense view. Gopnik’s belief that it does is based on an equation of concept and
theory, and it is this equation that I want to contest.
19 Thanks to Philip Gerrans for suggesting the analogy.
 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2002Theories of Mind and ‘The Commonsense View’ 479
acquired. This being so, it does not extend to knowledge that a content misrep-
resents.
Gopnik supposes that adopting an explanation in terms of the commonsense
view must involve taking a stand against the theory theory only because she
conceives of the commonsense view as committed to a particular version of
the perceptual model of self-knowledge. According to this, in perception one
is directly aware of the objects of perception in the sense that one’s awareness
is non-conceptual and non-intentional. Given that self-knowledge of one’s
own intentional states requires being aware of such states as intentional states
and so requires possession of the concept of intentionality, by Gopnik’s lights,
it requires possession of a theory. In possessing such a concept, one thereby
possesses a theory. In being theory-dependent, self-knowledge is inferential,
indirect. Direct awareness, as in perception and sensation, does not involve
being aware of the object of one’s awareness as one thing or another, or as
anything at all.
However, this is not the only, nor the most plausible model of perception
on which to base an account of introspective self-knowledge.20 As Gopnik
herself seems to recognize, there are perceptual models according to which,
in perception, one is aware of a thing as something or other, which requires
possession of concepts. She recognizes, for example, that perception can be
understood ‘transparently’ (as simply ‘seeing x’, for some object or state of
affairs x), or as ‘…mediated by representations or propositions’ (as in perceiving
or seeing that something is the case) (cf. 1993, p. 6). But she doesn’t seem to
recognize that the relevant analogy between self-knowledge and perception
might employ a notion that falls somewhere in-between these two: a notion
of ‘seeing as’, that might signal the concept-dependence of perception and so
its intentional nature without thereby construing it as fully propositional, as
beliefs are typically taken to be (McDowell, 1994; Brewer, 1999). One way
of putting this view is to say that perceptual experience is a matter of seeing
as in the sense that, when a subject has such an experience, she takes an object
X to have some property or other. She does so because the content of her
experience represents the world around her as being some way or other.
To accept a view like this is not necessarily to deny that there is much that
we see that we do not take ourselves to see. But it is to deny that the idea
that in perception we do not take an object X to be any way at all is a genuine
possibility. As Heil puts the point:
20 I am assuming here for the sake of argument that the commonsense view is actually commit-
ted to a perceptual account of how such access is achieved. My own view is that a ‘quasi’-
perceptual account of certain core cases of self-knowledge, namely, knowledge of one’s
current conscious thinkings, is both viable and defensible (Macdonald, 1995, 1998a and
1998b). However, the argument in this paper does not depend on accepting that view.
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…it is easy to imagine cases in which, for any given property, P,p o s -
sessed by X, S sees X without taking X to have P. And we might
describe such cases as ones in which S fails to see X under a certain
aspect. On the other hand, the plausibility of these cases may well rest
at least in part on the tacit assumption that X, if not seen under this
aspect, is seen under some other aspect, if not taken to have P,t h e n
taken to have some other property, P’. …seeing tout court requires that
there be cases in which S encounters X perceptually, but does not take
X to be any way at all. It is far from clear, however, that there are
any such cases…(1991, p. 8).
Heil’s claim is that whatever ‘perceptual experience’ is, for human beings any-
way, it is doubtful that it is completely unconceptualized, ‘nonepistemic’ per-
ception.21
An account of introspective self-knowledge based on a more robust percep-
tual model can accommodate both the idea that such knowledge requires
awareness of one’s own intentional states as intentional states and the idea that
such knowledge can be direct—as direct as is perception itself. The need to
appeal to the theory theory to explain self-knowledge of one’s intentional
states as intentional states (as about things and phenomena in the non-mental
world) is thereby made redundant.
This alternative explanation is preferable because it avoids commitment to
a counterintuitive view about how children understand their own intentional
psychological states, namely, that they do so by virtue of constructing a theory
of mind which they are then able to apply to them. At the same time, it leaves
those who do favour the theory theory free to endorse the commonsense view.
So there is nothing to be lost, and much to be gained, by rejecting the percep-
tual model on which Gopnik’s reasoning is based.
Let me be clear about what I am and what I am not saying here. I am not
saying that Gopnik is correct in her view that having a concept of intentionality
does involve knowing a theory, but somehow the theory does not have to be
involved epistemologically and so does not introduce any indirectness. I am
saying that, in Gopnik’s sense of ‘theory’, which assumes that a theory requires
a set of causal laws by which deductive-nomological explanations can be
21 The distinction between ‘epistemic’ and ‘nonepistemic’ perception is familiar from the work
of Fred Dretske, and Gopnik notes this when associating herself with Dretske and Gibson
in taking ‘perception’ to involve only ‘nonepistemic’ perception. What she endorses in
doing this is the claim that perceptual experience is non-conceptualized, non-intentional,
non-belief-dependent. Whether it is non-representational is a more subtle matter, and one
that I shall not address here. What matters for present purposes is that both Gibson and
Dretske draw a sharp distinction between experience and belief, and consider the former
to be independent of the latter. This distinction is highly controversial, however, amongst
both philosophers and psychologists. It informs Gopnik’s thinking in a way that does injustice
to current and historical views about the nature of perception itself.
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effected, I disagree that having a concept of intentionality involves knowing
a theory.22 I agree with Gopnik that children need to have developed concepts
of beliefs and the like in order to understand their own intentional psychologi-
cal states. But I think it no more plausible to maintain that possession of con-
cepts of belief and the like requires possession of a theory of intentionality
than it is to maintain that possession of a colour concept (also a ‘folk’ concept)
such as red requires a theory of colour (complete with causal laws by which
to predict and explain colour phenomena). And I take it that it is not plausible
to maintain the latter. So I deny that developing an interconnected network
of concepts amounts to developing knowledge of a theory, in Gopnik’s robust
sense of ‘theory’.
23 A fortiori, I deny:
…that children construct a coherent, abstract account of the mind
which enables them to explain and predict psychological phenomena.
Although this theory is implicit rather than explicit, this kind of cogni-
tive structure appears to share many features with a scientiﬁc theory.
Children’s theories of the mind postulate unobserved entities (beliefs
and desires) and laws connecting them, such as the practical syllogism.
Their theories allow prediction, and they change (eventually) as a result
of falsifying evidence. …Moreover, the child’s theory of mind is equ-
ally applicable to the self and to others. (1993, p. 10)
3. What Exactly is the Relation between the Theory Theory
and the Commonsense View?
Suppose, then, that the developmental data presents no problem for the com-
monsense view. What exactly is the relation between that view and the theory
theory? In order to answer this, we need to know more about the central
claims of the latter. From our discussion of Gopnik’s views, we know that
22 Further, I would deny the assumption, which Gopnik also seems to make, that inference
requires the possession and use of a theory in her sense of ‘theory’, either explicitly or
implicitly. For more on the rejection of this assumption, see Robert Brandom (1998).
23 So I do not see myself as necessarily in disagreement with those who, like Carruthers,
claim that the concept of belief is theory-embedded. Carruthers maintains that psychological
concepts such as that of belief is determined by the position or role they play in a folk-
psychological theory of the mind (structure and function). He denies that grasp of such a
theory involves being a ‘little scientist’, however, and so distances himself from the claims
made by Gopnik on behalf of the theory theory with regard to children. In the weaker
and more general sense of ‘theory’ according to which children before the age of 4 possess
one, I am less unsympathetic to the view that concept and theory go hand in hand. Further,
in this sense, it is possible to hold, as Carruthers argues, that theory possession does notentail
epistemic indirectness—at least no more so than does perception itself (1996, p. 26). What
he means here is that it need not involve any conscious, personal-level inferences. This is
consistent with my view.
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one such claim is that subjects’ understanding or knowledge of others’ psycho-
logical states is in some way mediated by a theory of mind. ‘Understanding
or knowledge’ seems to mean, not the mere attribution of mental states to
others, but the explanation of mental states, or the activity of predicting what
mental states another will be in.
A fruitful way to ﬂesh this claim out is in terms of the way in which the
theory theory accounts for our ‘folk’ psychological practice (Davies and Stone,
1996). From a very early age, we are remarkably competent at attributing
mental states to others, and at predicting and explaining their mental states and
behaviour by this means. There seem to be three aspects of or threads to this
practice: describing others in terms of mental states, explaining others’ mental
states and behaviour by means of such descriptions, and predicting others’
mental states and behaviour using these descriptions. A key commitment of
the theory theory is to account for the psychological practice of predicting
others’ mental states. It claims to do this by appeal to the thesis that predicting
others’ mental states requires the possession and application of a theory of
mind.
Theory theorists differ amongst themselves on their views as to the nature
of such a ‘theory’. Some, like Gopnik, think that it is characterized by prin-
ciples which take the form of universal causal laws, and that understanding
one’s own and others’ psychological states involves the application of such laws
to data, i.e., psychological experiences and behaviour (Gopnik, 1993; Gopnik
and Meltzoff, 1997; Perner and Ogden, 1988; Perner, 1991). These people
think of scientiﬁc theories as the paradigmatic example of theories. Others (e.g.
Stich and Nichols, 1995a, 1995b) think that almost any set of generalizations of
the ‘folk’ sort constitutes a theory of mind. Since most adults, as well as most
children, are not generally able to verbalize explicitly causal ‘laws’ of a theory
of mind understood in the ﬁrst way, those who conceive of a theory of mind
in the quite strict sense associated with such laws commonly claim that subjects
implicitly, rather than explicitly, possess a theory of mind.24
How much does this tell us about the compatibility or otherwise of the
theory theory with the commonsense view? It tells us very little. The com-
monsense view is ﬁrst and foremost a view about the epistemology of self-under-
24 For the purposes of distinguishing the theory theory from the simulation theory, the differ-
ence between the stronger sense of ‘theory’ associated with scientiﬁc theories and the weaker
sense of ‘theory’ by which almost any set of generalizations of a ‘folk’ sort counts as a theory
does not matter. But of course it does matter for the purposes of reconciling the common-
sense view with the theory theory. If the weaker sense is at issue, it is far easier to see how
the theory theory might be reconciled with the commonsense view, since perception itself—
what Gopnik takes to be a paradigmatic case in which one has direct and privileged self-
awareness—might on this weak sense be viewed as theory-laden and so conceptual.
Another issue that divides theory theorists from one another is whether the theory of
mind is innate or learned. Some, such as Gopnik, hold that it is learned, but others, such
as Baron-Cohen, hold that at least some of it is innate. Again, this is an issue concerning
which we need not adjudicate here.
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standing or self-ascription. Of course, any view about the epistemology of
self-understanding is likely to have some implications for cognition. But these
implications are not all that apparent or direct. For on at least one understand-
ing of it, the theory theory is not primarily a theory about the epistemology
of self-knowledge and knowledge of others; on what justiﬁes claims to self-
knowledge and knowledge of others. It is a theory about the nature of mental
concepts. It says that mental concepts are theoretical concepts. Viewed in this
way, there is no immediate inference from the adoption of the theory theory
to the truth or otherwise of the commonsense view, even if we suppose, with
Gopnik, that mental concepts are theoretical concepts because of how they
are constructed. This is because there is important distinction to be drawn,
concerning the epistemology of mental state attribution, about how it is that
judgements arrived at by a given methodology amount to knowledge, when
they do.
Further, there is a distinction to be drawn between what is involved in
grasp of mental concepts and what is involved in making predictions and expla-
nations. This distinction concerns the methodology of mental state attribution,
of how we go about making judgements about our own and others’ mental
states. Viewed as a claim about our grasp of mental concepts, the theory theory
may say only that grasping a concept is knowing a theory.25 This need not
involve any claims about how we predict and/or explain the mental states of
others. It may be that grasping a concept is knowing a theory, but that when
it comes to prediction and explanation of others’ mental states, we use simul-
ation as our method. Perhaps the opposite is true: that our grasp of mental
concepts is achieved in a simulation-theoretic way (e.g., one grasps mental
concepts by simulating in oneself the states (of oneself) that fall under those
concepts), but that when it comes to predicting and explaining the mental
states of others, a theory is called upon.
Gopnik asserts that the theory theory is incompatible with the common-
sense view. But, viewed as a theory about what is involved in grasp of mental
concepts, it seems to be silent on the methodology or epistemology of self-
knowledge. Suppose that it is true that mental concepts are deﬁned by their
theoretical role in a theory of mind, a theory about ‘what beliefs (etc.) really
are’, to use Gopnik’s terminology (1993, p. 95). Then they are constituted by
the role that they play in such a theory, usually conceived by theory theorists
to be some sort of functionalist theory. Functionalism, in the form that is
relevant to this discussion, is the thesis that the nature of a mental state, say,
a belief that water is transparent, is deﬁned by the causal relations that it is apt
to bear to environmental stimuli, or input, other mental states, and behavioural
25 For the purposes of theory theorists, I think that this involves commitment not only to the
view that concepts are theory embedded, but to the stronger view that concepts are individu-
ated by the theories in which they are embedded, so that grasp of the same concept requires
possession of the same theory.
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responses, or output.26 Thus, the concept of a belief, say, that water is trans-
parent, is the concept of a state which is apt to be caused by certain environ-
mental stimuli and other mental states, and to cause other mental states and
behavioural output.
This is a view to which Gopnik (1993, pp. 44–5) has expressly committed
herself. However, viewed in this way, the theory theory has nothing to say
about the epistemic means by which one is justiﬁed in knowing one’s own
states, nor about the methodology by which one grasps one’s own states. For
it is compatible with a functionalist account of the nature of mental states, say,
sensations, that such states are known or are knowable in ways other than by
their causal roles. Speciﬁcally, they may be known or be knowable in terms
of their phenomenological features, on the basis of how they feel. Similarly,
observable properties, like colours, may be known by subjects on the basis of
how they look, although the natures of these properties may consist in what
is the best opinion of normal subjects in normal conditions.
27
Thus, the theory theory may be consistently combined with the common-
sense view in one or the other of the following two ways, depending on
whether one considers the phenomenological aspects of one’s psychological
states to be functionally deﬁnable. First, one might maintain that the relation
between the phenomenological features of the states of which one is introspec-
tively aware and their causal roles is relevantly like the way in which a symp-
tom is related to whatever it is a symptom of (e.g., a disease), viz. as reliably
(perhaps even nomologically) causally related. As Sterelny puts the point:
I think a better strategy is to sharply distinguish the constitutive from
the epistemic. What an elephant is is one thing; how to recognize
elephants is another. No doubt there are trunkless elephants, and
trunked nonelephants. But if you are confronted with a trunk you will
not go far astray in supposing it comes with an elephant attached. An
agent might thus recognize creatures via this symptom of elephanthood
whether or not they had a complex understanding of what it was to
be an elephant, whether or not this symptom is even part of what
being an elephant is (1993, pp. 81–2).
Note here that, because the relationship between the symptom and what it is
a symptom of is conceived of as contingent, a subject’s introspective awareness
of her own psychological states could mislead her as to their natures. And this
would make her knowledge of her own intentional states fallible even if privi-
leged. Nevertheless, the direct and privileged nature of such knowledge would
remain intact.
26 People will recognize this as a version of the functional speciﬁcation theory. (See, for
example, Lewis, 1972.)
27 For an account like this see Johnston (1992, 1993).
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A second way in which the theory theory might be reconciled with the
commonsense view is by insisting that the phenomenological features by which
subjects introspectively know their own psychological states can themselves be
captured in the functional deﬁnitions by which their causal roles are speciﬁed
(Shoemaker, 1984). In the case of sensations, for example, one might insist
that functionalism is able to account for the phenomenological aspect of a
sensation, say, the painfulness of a pain, by taking it to be part of the causal
role of pain to cause the belief that one is hurting, to cause aversive behaviour
with respect to the source of the pain, and so on. If the phenomenological
aspects of sensations are themselves functionally deﬁnable, then it is not possible
to misidentify a state introspectively by identifying its phenomenological
aspect, for that aspect is part of its nature. Nor need that aspect be identiﬁed
introspectively by its causal role. Just as a subject might perceive the redness
of an apple without grasping the causal role it plays with regard to perceivers,
which role may constitute its nature, a subject might introspect the phenom-
enological aspect of her sensation state without introspecting the causal role
which constitutes its nature.28
This strategy will only work for intentional states if at least some of these
states have phenomenological features. But it may not be altogether implausible
to think that at least some of these—such as current, conscious thinkings,
imaginings, and pretendings—do have such phenomenological features, and
have them in virtue of their contents (cf. Goldman, 1993).
The claim that there is a distinctive phenomenological aspect to the con-
tents of current conscious thinkings, and so to at least some intentional states,
is consistent with the commonsense view. But Gopnik does not appreciate
this because she associates ‘phenomenological’ with ‘direct’ and ‘direct’ with
‘non-conceptualized’. However, suppose, as I have suggested, that current
conscious thinkings have both a phenomenological and a contentful represen-
tational aspect. Then, on Gopnik’s conception of the commonsense view,
which severs the phenomenological from the intentional features of intentional
states, we seem to be forced to choose between the two in accounting for
direct and privileged self-knowledge of such states. And this is just what Gop-
nik does. She supposes that one can be directly aware of one’s own states by,
and only by, being aware of a phenomenological content. The result is that
direct awareness of one’s intentional states is compatible with failure to know
those states as intentional states. But the commonsense view does not commit
one to anything so strong as this. It is compatible with the commonsense view
that subjects know their own intentional states as intentional states.
28 This way of reconciling the commonsense view with the theory theory is predicated on
the view that the theory theory is a theory about grasp of mental concepts. It will not satisfy
theory theorists (such as Stich and Nichols) who view the theory theory as a theory about
how predictions about and explanations of mental states are actually made.
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4. Conclusion
I have argued that Gopnik’s claim that the theory theory is incompatible with
the commonsense view of self-knowledge is false for two reasons. First, the
developmental data, while perhaps favouring the theory theory, does not rule
out the commonsense view. Second, Gopnik basis her claim about the com-
monsense view on a crude perceptual model of self-awareness, one which
could not support the commonsense view. It is that model which is faulty, and
which is ultimately responsible for Gopnik’s claim that, in order for subjects to
be aware of their intentional states as intentional states, they must acquire a
theory of mind by which to infer that their states are intentional. Without this
model of perception in place, there is no reason to think that knowing one’s
own states as intentional states requires the acquisition of a theory of mind.
Further, the commonsense view is neutral as between the theory theory
and other theories of mind. For the theory theory is not primarily an epistemo-
logical theory about the basis for knowledge of minds, one’s own or others.
Thus, its relation to the epistemology of self-knowledge is neither obvious,
nor direct.
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